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ADMINISTRATORS-JURISDICTION TO APPOINT-ADMINISTRATION OVER ESTATE OF
THE LiviN.-An administrator had been appointed by authority of statute over
the estate of a person who had been unheard from for more than 21 years.
The defendant bank paid this administrator the balance due the absentee, who
later returned and sued the bank. On his death the plaintiff was appointed
administratrix and coniinued the suit. The lower court held that payment to
the first administrator had discharged the deft to the absentee. Held, that the
judgment be affirmed. Hamilton v. Orange Savings Bank (1924, N. J. L.) i24
Atl. 62.
Under the ordinary statute authorizing appointment of an administrator upon
adjudication of death, tie jurisdictional fact is death. Administration on the
estate of one living is absolutely void and may be attacked collaterally by the
supposed deceased or by third parties. Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank
(i86I, Mass.) 3 Allen, 87; 1 Woerner, Am. Law of Administration (2d ed. i899)
sec. 208; COMMENTS (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 943, 944. The rule appar-
ently originated in early dicta. See Allen v. Dundas (1789, K. B.) 3 T. R. 125,
129, 130; Griffith v. Frazier (i8i, U. S.) 8 Cranch, 9, 23. The New York statute
expressly requires the surrogate to decide whether the absentee is dead. 2 Rev.
Sts. 1867, ch. 6, secs. 23, 26. But a "finding of death" was held to give jurisdiction
over the estate of one living. Roderigas v. Savings Institution (1875) 63 N. Y.
460. This seemingly unwarranted construction of a typical statute marked the
first attack upon the rule. In a later suit between the same parties a "finding of
death on evidence" was held necessary. Roderigas v. Savings Institution (1879)
76 N. Y. 316. The first Roderigas decision has been largely condemned. Devlin
v. Commonwealth (1882) iox Pa. 273; (1876) io Am. L. REV. 787. It received
favorable comment in the jurisdiction of the instant case where a third party's
collateral attack failed. Plume v. Savings Institution (1884) 46 N. J: L. 211.
The question was finally settled by a holding of the United States Supreme
Court that a statute of that type conferred no jurisdiction over estates of the
living. Scott v. McNeal (1894) 154 U. S. 34, 14 Sup. Ct iioS; see also Fridley
v. Savings Bank (917) 136 Minn. 333, 337, 162 N. W. 454, 455. For a criticism
of Scott v. McNeal as initiating the modern interpretation of "due process"
under the i4th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, claimed to be an
unwarranted extention of theory, see Smith, Decisive Battles of Constitutional
Law: XV The Revolution (i924) io A. B. A. JouR. 505, 5o6. To alleviate a rule
harsh to innocent third parties many statutes have been enacted expressly author-
izing courts, on proof of unexplained absence for a certain number of years, to
issue administration papers valid though the absentee is alive. Under these
statutes absence for the stated period, not death, is the jurisdictional fact. Pa.
Stat Law, 192o, secs. 8407-8422; Mass, Gen. Laws, 192r, ch. 200, pp. 2178-2180.
Although attacked under the "due process" clause of the I4th Amendment, the
majority of these statutes have been upheld. Cunnius v. Reading School District
(i9o5) i98 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 721; Nelson v. Blinn (19o8) 197 Mass. 279,
83 N. E. 889; contra: Clapp v. Hong (i9o4) 12 N. D. 6oo, 98 N. W. 710 (notice
insufficient). In such statutes apparently lies the solution of the disposition of
the estates of absentees. The court in the instant case, following the Roderigas.
and Plume ddcisions, has reached a seemingly just result by an apparently strained
interpretation of a statute similar to that of New York. It would seem better
to let the evil of Scott v. McNeal, if evil there be, be remedied by appropriate
legislation -along the line of the Pennsylvania statute.
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ARBITRATION AND AWARD-APPRAISAL AND ARBITRATION CONTRASTED.-The
defendant deposited stock in escrow to be held for the plaintiff upon the condi-
tion that on the happening of certain contingencies the defendant was to have
the right to purchase the stock at a fair value to be determined by three arbiters,
one to be chosen by each of the parties and the third by the two so chosen. The
contingency arose but the third arbiter was not selected. The plaintiff now asks
the court under the New York Arbitration Law, N. Y. Laws, ig2o, ch. 275, sec. 4,
which provides for court appointment, to make the appointment. The lower
Court held such an appointment appropriate and the defendant appealed. Held,
that the judgment be reversed, the Arbitration Law not applying because there
was no agreement for submission to arbitration. In re Fletcher (1924) 237
N. Y. 440, 143 N. E. 248.
At the time of submission to arbitration a present controversy between the
parties to the contract is essential. Tdledo S. S. Co. v. Zenith Transp. Co. (1911,
C. C. A. 6th) 184 Fed. 391; Irwin v. Hoyt (1913) 162 Iowa, 679, 144 N. W. 584.
An agreement to submit may only look forward to the possibility of there being
a controversy. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co. (1920) 285 Mo. 342, 226 S. W.
846. But an agreement for an appraisal or valuation is to avoid a controversy.
Omaha Water Co. v. Omaha (19o8, C. C. A. 8th) 62 Fed. 225; Sebree v. Board of
Education (1912) 254 Ill. 438, 98 N. E. 931. That this distinction is still import-
ant under modern statutes, as at common law, is illustrated by the principal
case. Arbitrators must follow quasi-judicial procedure. Curran v. City of
Philadelphia (I919) 264 Pa. III, IO7 Ati. 636 (notice of meetings); Dworkin
v. Caledonian Ins. Co., supra (hearing testimony) ; Hills v. Home Ins. Co. (188o)
129 Mass. 345 (presence of arbitratbrs). Appraisers are free to act on their
own knowledge and experience. Omaha Water Co. v. Om'aha, supra; Thompson
v. Newman (1918, Calif. D. C. A. Ist) 171 Pac. 982. Action will not lie against
an arbitrator personally for negligence or fraud. Hoosac Tunnel Dock Co. v.
O'Brien (1884) 137 Mass. 424; Hutchins v. Merrill (I912) 109 Me. 313, 84 Atl.
412. But it does lie against- an appraiser. Turner v. Goulden (1873) L. R. 9
C. P. 57. The power of arbitrators, when not confirmed by rule of court, can
be revoked by either party before an award has been made. Martin v. Vansant
(917) 99 Wash. lo6, 68 Pac. 99o; First Ecclesiastical Soc. of New Britain v.
Besse (1923) 98 Conn. 616, 119 Atl. 9o3. The power of an appraiser is irre-
vocable. Palmer v. Clark (I87I) 1o6 Mass. 373, 389. An award in arbitration
supersedes the original cause of action. Billmyer v. Hamburg-Bremen Fire
Ins. Co. (195o) 57 W. Va. 42, 49 S. E. goi; Johnsen v. Wineman (1916) 34
N. D. 116, 157 N. W. 679. But an appraisal is not conclusive unless so stipu-
lated, and suit may be brought on the original demand. Nelson v. Betcher
Lumber Co. (I9O3) 88 Minn. 517, 93 N. W. 66i. The New York Arbitration
Law does not affect the distinctions between arbitration and appraisal, and is
applicable, only to the former. It merely makes arbitration agreements legal
and irrevocable.
BILLS AND NOTES-REFERENCE TO EXTRINSIC CONTRACT AS AFFECTING NEGo-
TIABLTvy.-In a suit by the holder in due course against the" acceptor of two
customers' acceptances, unpaid at maturity, the defense set up was that the
acceptance was rendered. conditional and the instrument non-negotiable by the
words "As per Reolo, Inc., contract" which immediately followed the expression
."accepted for payment." The lower court refused to give instructions which
assumed the instrument to be negotiable and, in effect, held that the acceptance
was conditional. Held, that the .judgment be "affirmed International Finance
Corporation v. Calvert Drug Co. (1924, Md.) 124 At. 89L
Sec: 3 of the N. I. L. provides that, "An unqualified order or promise to pay
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is unconditional within the meaning- of this act, thofigh, coupled with . . . a
statement of the transaction which gives rise to the instrument." Sec. 141
provides that, "An acceptance is qualified, which is . . . conditional, that is to
say, which makes payment by the acceptor dependent on the fulfilment of a
condition therein stated." Some courts, by strict construction as in the instant
case, interpret the phrase "as per" in the sense of "subject to" or "according to"
and hold the paper non-negotiable by applying the latter section. Continental
Bank v. Times Pub. Co. (1917) I42 La. 209, 76 So. 612. A fortiori does this
result follow where these phrases are expressly used. Klots Throwing Co. v.
Manufacturers' Co. (i91o, C. C. A. 2d) I79 Fed. 813; (ii8) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 559; 30 L. R. A. (Nc.s.) 40, note. Other courts apply sec. 3 of the
act and hold such instruments negotiable. National Bank v. Wentworth (I914)
218 Mass. 30, io5 N. E. 626; International Fin. Corp. v. Northwestern Drug Co.
(1922, D. Minn., 4 th) 282 Fed. 920. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
show an instrument negotiable or non-negotiable. Waterbury-Wallace Co. v.
Ivey (1917, Sup. Ct. App. T.) 99 Misc. 26o, 163 N. Y. Supp. 719. The tendency
of the courts is to construe commercial instruments having on them a memo-
randum or reference to dealings between the parties as negotiable, if they in
other respects have all the characteristics of negotiability. Waterbury-Wallace
Co. v. Ivey, supra; cf. COMMENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 02. The
question of notice, as dealt with in secs. 52 and 56 of the N. I. L., seems to
receive scant attention in most of these cases. It would seem that in the absence
of other suspicious circumstances, this phrase is not such an irregularity as
to put the holder on inquiry. In one instance, however, it has been held to
charge the holder with notice of what fair inquiry would have disclosed.
Snelling Bank v. Clasen (1916) 132 Minn. 404, 157 N. W. 643. Greater circula-
tion of commercial paper tends to lower interest rates and stability of' circulation
makes for efficiency in handling business affairs. If negotiability is a socially
desirable end, an instrument should be held negotiable where two interpretations
are equally possible. See NOTES (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 321.
CONTRACTS-CHARTABLE SUBSCRIPTIONS-CoNsIERATIo..-An agreement was
executed whereby each subscriber "agreed with the other subscribers" to pay a
certain sum of money for the benefit of the plaintiff League, and the latter "agreed
to use all money received for benefit of league." Defendant's intestate subscribed
$i5,ooo. Relying on these subscriptions, plaintiff incurred obligations. In a suit
to recover the amount of the subscription, the lower court held the promise enforce-
able. Held, that the judgment be affiriued. Eastern States Agricultural and Indus-
trial League v. Vail's Estate (1924, Vrt) 124 Atl. 568.
Charitable subscriptions were originally held mere gratuities, revocable at will.
Bridgewater Academy v. Gilbert (1824, Mass.) 2 Pick. 578. This view still obtains
in England. In re Hudson (1885) 54 L. J. Ch. 811. The American courts have,
however, receded, perhaps out of regard for a desire to give greater stability to
institutions largely dependent on public donations. 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 784, note.
As a result of this desire various technical reasons have been advanced for holding
the subscriber. COMMENTS (1922) 8 CORN. L QUART. 57; see Barnes v. Perine
(1854) 12 N. Y. 18, 24. It is generally held, as in the principal case, that work
done or money expended in reliance on a subscription constitutes consideration,
where the promisor ought to have foreseen that such action would take place, and
the promisee reasonably believes it to be desired. Y. M. C. A. v. Estill (1913)
14o Ga. 291, 78 S. E. 1075; Anson's Contracts (Corbin's ed. 1919) 124, note; i
Williston, Contracts (1920) sec. 116. Some courts have enforced the promise in
such cases on the ground of "promissory estoppel." Simpson College v. Tuttle
(1887) 71 Iowa, 596, 33 N. W. 74. Courts again find consideration in the mutual
promises of the subscribers. Christian College v. Hendley (1875) 49 Calif. 347.
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Even though the plaintiff is not the promise% and the consideration moves from a
third party, this contract, made expressly for the benefit of the beneficiary, has
been held to create in him an enforceable right to the payment of the money.
Seaver v. Ransom (1918) 224 N. Y. 233, i2O N. E. 639; contra: Cottage Street
Clarch v. Kendall (x877) 121 Mass. 528. It has been held that the promise of
the beneficiary to make the desired application of te' fund* supplies the necessary
consideration for the subscriber's promise. Foreign Missions v. Smith (i9o4) 2o9
Pa. 361, 58 Atl. 689. The promise of the payee, if not express, is readily implied
from its acceptance of the pledge. Some courts hold that the benefit accruing from
the meritorious application of the fund furnishes legal consideration. Universalist
Church v. Pungs (i9ox) i26 Mich. 67o, 86 N. W. 235. Strong "moral obligation"
has sometimes been advanced as the ground for upholding the pledge. Caul v.
Gibson (1846) 3 Pa. 416. These various theories advanced by the courts for
enforcing the subscriber's promise indicate a strong tendency to arrive at a
pre-determined but favorable conclusion, irrespective of definitions of the. term
"consideration."
EMINENT DOMAIN-COMPENSATION FOR IMPROVEMENTS BY CONDEMNOR NOT
AuLowED.-The plaintiff railroad company purchased in good faith from a tenant
for life what it believed to be the fee and erected thereon a passenger station and
other buildings. The defendant was later judicially determined to be the owner.
In condemnation proceedings to acquire the fee, the lower court allowed the value
of the improvements to be included in the measure of compensation. Held, that
the judgment be reversed. New York, Ontario & Western R. R. v. Livingston
(1924, N. Y.) 144 N, E. 589.
A life tenant, even though he believes himself to be the owner in fee, is generally
not entitled to reimbursement from the remainderman for permanent improvements.
Jacobs v. Steinbrink (1914, 2d Dept.) 164 App. Div. 715, 149 N. Y. Supp. 337;
Shelangowski v. Schrack (1913) 162 Iowa, 176, 143 N. W. io8i; (1924) 24 CoT.
L. REV. 435; contra: Harriett v. Harriett (192i) 181 N. C. 75, io6 S. E. 221.
But in a suit in equity for mesne profits by the true owner, one occupying under
color of title is allowed the value of his improvements. Wakefield v. Van Tassell
(1905) 218 Ill. 572, 75 N. E. 1o58. In most states the same result is reached by
the "Betterment Acts." Bloom v. Straus (19o2) 7o Ark. 483, 72 S. W. 563; see
(1923) 33 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 100. Some courts have granted relief in an
affirmative action. Bright v. Boyd (i841, C. C. D. Me.) I Story, 478; 2 Story,
Equity Jurisprudence (ith ed. 1873) see. 1237. Where, as in the instant case, a
public agency, with the power of eminent domain, enters lawfully on the land and
improves it in good faith, it may exclude the value of the improvements in pro-
ceedings brought thereafter to condemn hostile rights. The technical punitive rule
of fixtures- is disregarded as inconsistent with the public use and the principle of
"just compensation." Searl v. School District (89o) 133 U. S 553, TO Sup. Ct.
374; Chicago, P. & St. L. Ry. q. Vaughn (1903) 206 Ill. 234, 69 N. E. 113.
Similarly, where the entry is trespassory but under an honest claim. Greve v. St.
Paul &" Pacific R. R. (1879) 26 Minn. 66, I N. W. 816. Where the owner is
unknown, good faith may be established by the intent to bring proper proceedings
in the future. Chase v. Jeminett (1892) 8 Utah, 231, 30 Pac. 757. Inaction by
the owner with knowledge has been held to be acquiescence in the entry. McClar-
ren v. School District (1907) 169 Ind. i4o, 82 N. E. 73; contra: Meriam v. Brown
(i88o) 128 Mass. 391. But some courts go much further than the instant case
and allow the public agency the value of its improvements even where there it
has wilfully or violently trespassed. Justice v. Nesquehoning R. R. (1878) 87 Pa.
28; Santa Fe Ry. v. Richter (915) 20 N, M. 278, 148 Pac. 28; contra: St. Johns-
ville v. Smith (i906) 184 N. Y. 341, 77 N. E. 617; Virginia R. R. v. Nickels (1914)
116 Va. 792, 82 S. E. 693; (1900) 14 HA,,v. L. REV. 72.
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GoODwIL-DuTY OF SURVIVING PARTNER TO ACCOUNT TO ESThATE OF DECEASED
PARTNER.--In a proceeding to settle executors' accounts the plaintiff guardian of
infant remaindermen objected that defendants, executors and trustees, failed to
include in their accounting of deceased's assets the value of his interest in the
goodwill of a stock brokerage firm of which he was a partner at the time of his
death. Held, that the value of the goodwill should have been included. In re
Brown (1924, Surro. Ct. N. Y.) N. Y. L. JouR., Vol. 71, no. 93-
The business community has increasingly capitalized the psychological phenom-
enon of habit-forming-i.e. of "going back to the old place." -Foreman, Conflict-
ing Theories of Goodwill (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 638; Mechem, Elements of the
Law of Partnership (2d ed. 192o) see. 127; (1919) 17 MICH. L. REV. 345. But
however valuable in swelling profits, goodwill is held not an asset of a partnership
unless it has market value. Lindley, Partnership (8th ed. 1912) 567, 508. Where
the goodwilltends to be independent of persons and attach to products, trademarks,
etc. its transferable value is clear. President Suspender Co. v. MaclWilliam
(igi6, C. C. A. 2d) 238 Fed. i59. But where it is personal reputation, it may be
worthless in fact apart from the person who built it up. In re Caldwell's Estate
(1919, Surro. Ct) 1O7 Misc. 316, 176 N. Y. Supp. 425; see Rutan v. Coolidge
(1922) 241 Mass. 584, 136 N. E. 257. Until recently professions hae been gener-
ally held to have no saleable goodwill. Arundell v. Bell (1883) 52 L. J. Ch. 537
(solicitor) ; Slack v. Suddoth (1899) 1O2 Tenn. 375, 52 S. W. i8o. But as good-
will of professions is actually bought and sold, courts have come to protect it
and thus add to its factual value. Tichenor v. Newman (igoo) 186 Ill. 264, 57
N, E. 826; MacFadden v. Jenkins (1918) 4o N. D. 422, 169 N. W. 151; see Cowan
v. Fairbrother (i86) 11S N. -C. 4o6, 24 S. E. 212. And courts impose on the
vendor of the goodwill of a profession a duty not to compete with the vendee,
since all but the nominal value of such a purchase consists in removing the vendor's
competition. Brown v. Benringer (1912) 118 Md. 29, 84 AtI. 79; Foss v:* Roby
(1907) 195 Mass. 292, 8i N. E. i99. Once the fact of saleable value of the good-
will was found, by the old rule it belonged to the surviving partner. Hammond'v.
Douglas (i8oo, Ch.) 5 Ves. 539; Lewis v. Langdon (1835, Ch.) 7 Sim. 421. But
now it must be accounted for by the surviving partner with other assets belonging
to the partnership as distinct from the partners. Slater t. Slater (1903) 175 N. Y.
143, 67 N. E. 224; Hill v. Fearis figo5] i Ch. 466; Brooklyn Trust Co. v.
McCutchen (1914, E. D. N. Y.) 215 Fed. 952. If the sale is of the good-Mill, other
than that of a profession, in the absence of contrary agreement the vendor may
compete with the vendee in every way except by soliciting old customers. Trego
v. Hunt [1896, H. L.] A. C. 7; L. R. A. 1918 F, 1179 note; contra: Cottrell v.
Babcock (1886) 54 Conn. 122, 6 At. 791 (solicitation allowed); Gordon v. Knott
(i9o8) I99 Mass. 173, 85 N. E. 184 (Mass. rule that vendor may not compete).
But if the "sale" is "involuntary," the vendor may solicit old customers. Green V.
Morris [1914] i Ch. 562 (forced sale by trustees for benefit of creditors). So if
it is known that the surviving partner intends to thus compete after the sale, the
market value of the partnership goodwill may be gone. Lindley, oP. cit. 512.
Especially if a "sale" on the death of a partner be held an "involuntary sale."
See Hutchinson v. Nay (1903) 183 Mass. 355, 67 N. E. 6oi; but see Costa v.
Costa (1915) 222 Mass. 280, Io N. E. 309. But he is under no duty to retire
from business to preserve this asset. Trego v. Hunt, supra. The partnership
goodwill being so easily dissipated, the rule fairer to the parties seems to require
the survivor to account for its value as of the-time of the death. Costa v. Costa,
supra; but see contra: Hutchinson v. Nay, supra. The instant case is sound in
recognizing the value of a commodity in which the economic community trades.
Hill v. Fearis, supra; sEe (1924) N. Y. L. JoiM, Vol. 71, no. 141. But as a
practical matter, in the absence of insurance, a duty to pay for this goodwill may
financially embarrass a firm which may lack the requisite ready money.
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INSURANcE-ToRTs-DUTY OF INSURANCE COMPANY ON RECEIPT OF APPLICA-
TION.-The deceased applied for life insurance and paid the first premium. The
company delayed in acting on the application and further delayed in delivering the
policy. In the interim the applicant died. His administrator and the beneficiary
each sued separately in tort. From-a ruling sustaining demurrers each plaintiff
appealed. Held, that the complaint of the administrator stated a cause of action,
but that that of the beneficiary did not. DeFord v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1924,
Colo.) 224 Pac. lO49.
Under the policy, its delivery to and receipt by the applicant were made condi-
tions precedent to effectiveness. Such stipulations are usually literally construed.
Vance, Insurance (i9O4) 161, 167, i69; Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Ins.
Policy (1920) 33 HARV. L. REv, 198, 220. But this action was not on the policy.
A duty, said to be in tort, arising from the semi-public nature of the business and
from common concepts of "fair dealing," was found for the insurance company
either to issue it policy within a reasonable time or to reject the application and
return the money. Boyer v. State Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. *Co. (1912) 86 Kan.
442, 121 Pac. 329; Duffle v. Bankers' Life Assoc. (1913) i6o Iowa, 19, 139 N. W.
1o87; but see Page v. Nat. Auto. Ins. Co. (1922) lO9 Neb. 127, 19o N. W. 213;
contra: Interstate Business Men's Assoc. v. Nichols (1920) x43 Ark. 369, 22o
S. W. 477. See also (1919) 3 MINN. L. REV. 53. This duty was found owing to
the deceased and hence survived to his administrator. Duffle v. Bankers' Life
Assoc., supra. But it has been held that such a tort action will not survive.
Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co. (1920) 295 Il. 381, 129 N. E. 171. This is true
of a tort action for personal injuries, but an action in tort for injury to the
personal .estate does, in general, survive. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co: v. Lem-
mons (x923, Okla.) 2 Pac. 255; 3 Schouler, Wills, Executors and Administrators
(6th ed. 1923) 2o81, et seq. Due to a statute permitting the survival of such actions,
the question did not arise in the instant case. Colo. Rev. Sts. 19o8, sec. 7258. The
beneficiary had no standing as the suit was not on the policy. But it has been
argued that since the substantial loss falls on him, he should be allowed to sue in
tort on the interference with his expectancy. COilMENTS (1920) 29 YALE LAW
JOURN.L, 673, 677; but cf. (1919) 28 ibid. 5o7. Any apparent difficulty as to
survivorship may be obviated by basing the duty on an implied promise to issue
a policy or reject the application and return the money within a reasonable time.
The consideration is the application at the agent's solicitation and payment of the
premium. See Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lgminons, supra. However we
find the duty, in tort or in quasi-contract, there is "no real distinction." See
Stearns v. Merchants' Life and Casualty Co. (1917) 38 N. D. 524, 530, 165 N. W.
568, 57o. The decisions impose a duty on the insurance company. 
If it should
not be labelled "tort" or "quasi-contractual," such difficulties as arise from 
applying
the attributes of tort or quasi-contractual actions, might be obviated.
MUNICIPAL COPORATIONS-CoMPENSATION FOR SPECIAL POLICE SERVIcE.-The
defendants, owners of collieries, fearing violence to their safety-men during 
a
strike, executed a requisition on the local police authority for special police service
in the form of a stationary garrison on their premises. The requisition 
contained
a schedule of rates for the.pay and maintenance of the men so supplied, 
and an
agreement to pay accordingly. . In a suit upon this agreement, 
judgment was
rendered for the plaintiff. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment be
affirmed. Glamorgan County Council v. Glasbrook Brothers, 
Ltd. (1924, C. A.)
4o T. L. R. 448.
Contracts which have as consideration the performance of a pre-existing 
legal
duty are not usually enforced; but performance in excess of what that duty
requires is generally held good consideration. Corbin, Pre-existing 
Duty and Con-
rideration (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 362; I Williston, Contracts (1920) sec.
102
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132. In the latter situation, as, in the instant case, there is, however, a' question
which cannot be properly considered in terms of contract law, i. e. whether or not
it is illegal or against public policy to make a charge for special police service
rendered on request Moreover it is doubtful whether the duty of the state to
render police protection is a pre-existing legal duty within the meaning of that
rule. Cf. Fowler v. City of Cleveland (1919) ioo Ohio St 158, 126 N. E. 72.
It has been considered that to allow public officers to make special charges would
always be bad policy. I Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown (Leach's ed. 1788) c. 68,
sec. 4. This ratio decidendi has prevented public officers from obtaining rewards
for service done in the course of duty. Cf. Somerset Bank v. Edmund (x9o7)
76 Ohio St 396, 81 N. E. 641; Rogers v. McCoach (19o9, Sup. Ct Spec. T.)
66 Misc. 85, i2o N. Y. Supp. 686. But where the officer has gone beyond the
scope of his official duty a recovery has been allowed. Sith v. Fenner (1918)
1o2 Kan. 830, 172 Pac. 514; Miners' Wholesale Grocery Co. et al. v. Jennings
(1924, Okla.) 224 Pac. 192; L. R. A. I9i8E, 351, note. By analogy it may be
argued that payment may be had for rendering special police service, without
collision with what has been considered good policy, Where the police service is
primarily for the benefit of the individual, the person requesting the service pays
for it Cf. Tannenbaum v. Rehum (1907) 152 Ala. 494, 44 So. 532; 2 Dillon,
Municipal Corporations (5th ed. 19II) sec. 72o and note (police services at theatre).
Statutes have expressly sanctioned and provided for charges in this zone of police
protection. (189o)-53 & 54 Vict c. 45, sec. 23 (1). (But see Carmichael, The
County and Borough Police Acts (igoo) 3O to the effect that an agreement by
a corporation to pay fees as a condition precedent to performance is ultra vires.)
Ohio Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 5893 (police for Chautauquas) ; ibid. sec. 9154 (police
for railroads); N. Y. Consol. Laws, i9og, ch. 64, sec. 1o5 (police for signal
and telegraph companies) ; ibid. ch. 35, sec. 193 (police for fairs) ; ibid. ch. 35,
sec. 47 (police for corporations maintaining parks, play-grounds, etc,). But in
the ordinary zone of police protection where the interests of the public are more
apparent, payment for services is inconsistept with prevalent ideas of the functions
of the state. Between these two extremes is a half-way zone, in which the instant
case lies. Although the quartering of police forces in a mine for the duration of
a strike seems to be a performance in excess of the normal duties of the police,
query, whether it is good policy to have the police authority in such a position
that they can refuse to act unless an agreement to pay them is first made.
PLEADING-ALTERNATIVE ALLEGATIONS AS TO SUBJECT MATTEP-In a suit for
reformation of a lease, the lessee alleged that "because of mutual mistake or
mistake of the lessee and fraud of the lessor" the lease did not embody a previous
oral agreement The lower court ruled on a motion to dismiss the complaint as
not stating a cause of action that the allegation was not defective although made
in the alternative,. Held, (one judge dissenting in part) that the judgment be
affirmed. Kass v. Garment Center Realty Co., Inc. (1924, ist Dept. N. Y.) 209
App. Div. 647, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 94-
Under strict common law pleading allegations of causes of action or of defenses
in the alternative were held bad. Cook v. Cox (1814, K. B.) 3 M. & S. IIO;
Stephen, Pleading (Williston's ed. 1895) 426; NOTES (1919) 33 HARV. L. REV.
244- Under the modern codes, pleading in the alternative is generally not per-
mitted. McCrossin v. Noyes Bros. and Cutler (1919) 143 Minn. i81, 173 N. W.
s66. This strict rule has been abrogated by statute or code, or by rule of court,
in England and in at least six jurisdictions in this country. THE ANNU AL
PRACTICE (1924) Order ig, Rules 4, 24; Conn. Prac. Book (1922) 282, sec. 174;
Ky. Code Civ. Prac., 19oo, art. 113, sec. 4; 2 Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 231,
sec. 37; I Mo. Rev. Sts., 1919, sec. 1254; N. J. Comp. Sts. (1st supp. 1911-
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,915) I215, art. 17o, rule 53; (but compare Hankin, Alternative and Hypothetical
Pleadings (924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 365, 373) ; N. M. Sts. (codification of
1915) 12oo, art. 4141, sec. 75. By statute it seems that three states have permitted
criminal indictments to be in the alternative. Ala. Crim. Code, 19o7, secs. 7149,
7150; Minn. Gen. Sts. 1913, art. 9138; Tex. Complete Sts. 192o, Crim. Proced.
sec. 473. Pleading in the alternative as to subject matter appe - .rs to have been
sanctioned in ten states by judicial decision. Sloss-Sheffield Co. V. Pilgrim (1915)
14 Ala. App. 346, 79 So. 301; Pacetti v. Ga. Ry. (19o9) 6 Ga. App. 97, 64 S. E.
302; (but see Roebling's Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co. (1914) 142 Ga. 464,
83 S. E. 138) ; Farmers' Bank of Arispe v. Arispe Mercantile Co. (908) i39
Iowa, 246, 117 N. W. 672; Coleman v. Teddlie (I9OO) io6 La. 192, 3o So. 99;
Dick v. Hyer (1916) 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N. E. 251; Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v.
McIntire (I9Ir) 29 Okla. 797, ii9 Pac. ioo8; Turney v. Southern Pacific Co.
(904) 44 Or. 280, 75 Pac. 144; City of San Antonio v. Potter (903) 31 Tex.
App. 263, 71 S. W. 764; Rasmussen v. McKnight (1883) 3 Utah, 315, 3 Pac. 83.
See Williams v. United States (i891) 138 U. S. 514, 11 Sup. Ct. 457, and i Bates,
New Pleading Practice, Parties & Forms (923) 475. The majority of the New
York decisions on this subject are in accord.with the instant case. See note in
Munn v. Cook (i89o, N. Y.) 24 Abb. New Cas. 314-357; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
McCurdy (1907, 1st Dept.) ii8 App. Div. 815, 1O3 N. Y. Supp. 829; contra:
Cohn v. Graber (1922, ist Dept.) 2O App. Div. 264, 194 N. Y. Supp. 233. An
analogous, situation is presented in respect to joinder of parties in the alternative.
Eames v. Mayo (i919) 93 Conn. 479, io6 Atl. 825; see (1924) 33 YALE LAW
JoURNAL, 328. Application of the rule forbidding alternative pleading as to subject
matter often operates harshly, as the plaintiff cannot thus allege with certainty
facts known peculiarly to the defendant. See note to Munn v. Cook, supra, at p.
332, 333; Hankin, op. cit. supraat p. 368. The instant case properly follows the
more liberal tendency of its own jurisdiction and applies a rule which ought to be
more generally available under moidern pleading codes. See Hankin, op. cit. supra;
(1923) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i09.
PLEADING-ELEcrION OF REMEDims-RATIFicATIoN.-Plaintiff discontinued an
action at law to recover damages for fraud whereby he had been induced to sell
and convey land, after defendant had pleaded the statute of limitations and the
case had been placed upon the calendar. In a subsequent suit for rescission, the
lower court decided that there had been no election of remedies or ratification of
contract such as would bar the present action. Held, that the judgment be affirmed.
Schenck v. State Line Telephone Co. (1924) 238 N. Y. 3o8, 14 N. E. 592.
The violation of a primary right may give rise to several substantive secondary
rights and more than one procedural right. Cf. Friederichsen v. Renard (1917)
247 U. S. 207, 210, 38 Sup. Ct. 450, 451; Clark, The Code Cause of Action (1924)
33 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 817, 829. Where the choice is between procedural rights
merely, courts have no difficulty in allowing eitheror both, in some cases even to
judgment, but with only one satisfacti6n. American Process Co. v. Florida White
Pressed Brick Co. (1908) 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942. Where substantive secondary
rights are, however, inconsistent, courts are not agreed as to what constitutes a
final choice of one barring recourse to another. Nor can a common principle
upon which the rule might depend be agreed upon. See Hine, Election of
Remedies (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 7o7. That there may be an election of reme-
dies, two or more substantive secondary rights must exist. Henry v. Herrington
(19o8) ig3 N. Y. 218, 86 N. E. 29; Bristline v. United States (1916, C. C. A.
9th) 229 Fed. 546; cf. Segerstrom v. Holland Piano Mfg. Co. (1923) 1.55 Minn.
50, i62 N. W. i9. If the substantive right has not been decided in one action,
courts should permit pursuance of the other. Cf. United States v. Oregon Lunbet
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Co. (1922) 260 U. S. 290, 303, 43 Sup. Ct 100, 104; Lampen v. Kedgewin (1676,
C. B.) i Mod. *2o7; v. Campbell (1771, I. B.) 3 Wils. 240. And after
the statute of limitations has operated to bar the first action, it cannot be said
that there was a choice. Tullos v. Mayfield (1917, Tex. Civ. App.) 198 S. W.
1O73; see United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., supra, at pp. 299, 304, 43 Sup.
Ct at pp. 1O2, 104; contra: Stokes v. Wright (1917) 2o Ga. App. 325, 93 S. E.
27. Compromise and settlement of suit is certainly election. Knowles v. Dark &
Boswell (1924, Ala.) 99 So. 312. Where a suit is vexatious, or merely experi-
ments with the remedies afforded, then the bringing of the first suit ought to be
held an election. Cf. Sanger v. Wood (18IS) 3 Johns. 'Ch. 416, 421. Where a
transaction is voidable for fraud, as in the instant case, it may be rescinded, and
the pArties put'in statu quo, or affirmed, and an action brought to recover damages
for the fraud. On the theory that the abandonment of a suit for rescission is
an affirmance of the contract, a subsequent suit for damages is allowed. Cohoon
v. Fisher (.1897) 146 Ind. 583, 45 N. E. 787. But on the ground that a man may
not take contradictory positions, many courts say that an action for damages
resulting from fraud is so inconsistent with a subsequent action for rescission that
it cannot be maintained even though the first action be abandoned before judgment;
the contract having been ratified, it could not thereafter be disaffirmed. Cohoon v.
Fisher, supra. But why is not an abandonment of an action to recover for fraud
a disaffirmance if the signification of the will to ratify is expressed only by the
will to sue? The rule of election of remedies usually operates against the one
entitled to the redress, and should be applied with a view toward enabling him to
recover.
PRAcTicE-DISCOVERY-INHERENT PowER OF LAw COURT TO ORDER EXAMINA-
1oN.-In an action of book account for flooring furnished and laid, the lower
court granted the plaintiff authority to examine the flooring before trial with
experts of his own choice. Held, that the court had no inherent authority to order
such examination. O'Reilly v. Superior Court (1924, P. L) 124 At. i.
Although .discovery is an equitable rather than a common law incident, physical
examination of parties was frequently ordered at common law. Le Barron v.
Le Barron (1862) 35 Vt. 365; 2 Bishop, Marriage, Divorce and Separation (1891)
sec. 1298 (allegation of impotency in divorce cases) ; In re Blakemnore (1845) 14
L. J. Ch. 336; i Coke, Littleton (853) *8b; Reg.* Brev. Orig. (1687) 227 (writ
de ventre inspiciendo to fbrestall fraudulent claims of heirship); 3 Blackstone,
Commentaries *331 (plea by defendant of death of plaintiff and appearance of one
claiming as plaintiff) ; ibid. (in cases involving the age of an infant) ; Case of
Abbott of Strata Mercella (1591) 9 Co. Rep. 31a; 3 Blackstone, loc. cit. supra
(appeal of mayhem). Some courts now deny the power to order physical exami-
nation. of the plaintiff in actions for personal injuries, on grounds of lack of
precedent at common law. Larson v. Salt Lake City (1908) 34 Utah, 318, 97 Pac.
483; Stack v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. (19oo) 177 Mass. 155, 58 N. E. 686.
The majority of jurisdictions, however, recognize the discretionary power to order
such. examination as an expansion of the settled principles formerly applied in the
above cited instances. Schroeder v. C. R. L & P. R. R. (1877) 47 Iowa, 375;
City of So. Bend v. Turner (igOI) 156 Ind. 418, 6o N. E. 271. Statutes authoriz-
ing physical examination in personal actions have been declared constitutional.
Lyon v. Manhattan 1y. (1894) 142 N. Y. 298, 37 N. E. 113; McGovern v. Hope
(1899) 63 N. J. L. 76, 42 Atl. 83o. But at common law production and inspection
of documents was generally not allowed. Anonymous (1702, K. B.) 3 Salk. 362;
see Habershon v. Troby (1799, K B.) 3 Esp. 38. Nor examination of real prop-
erty in suits of this nature. Turquand v. Guardians of Strand Union (184o,
Exch.) 8 Dow. 2oi; Newham ,. Tate (1838, C, P.) x Ar. 244; 4 Wigmore,
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Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sec. 2221; contra: Clark v. Tulare Lake Dredging Co.
(1io) I4 Calif. App. 414, iia Pac. 564. Courts of equity, therefore, granted
discovery in aid of actions pending at law. Singer v. Bowne (1912) 81 N. J.
Eq. i57, 85 At]. 449; 2 Daniell, Chancery Pleading and Practice (6th ed. 1894)
sec. 1817; 24 L. R. A. 183, note. Common law courts were granted the power
to order the inspection of documents by statute. (i85) 14 & 15 Vict., c. 99, sec. 6.
Later the power to order examination of real and personal property was granted.
(1854) 17 & I8 Vict, c. 125, sec. 58. In this country such statutes are generally
not held to abrogate the powers of equity courts to grant discovery. Starkweather
v. Williams (898) 21 R. I. 55, 41 Atl. 1OO3; Reynolds v. Fibre Co. (1902) 71
N. H. 332, 5 At. lIO75. Although the instant case may be supported by precedent,
the cases denying the power to order examination of documents and real property
seem to afford a better foundation than the somewhat doubtful authority of the
physical examination cases on which the court relies. In states where law and
equity are combined under the code, the examination in question may more readily
be supported. N. Y. Report of Comnissioners on Practice and Pleading (1848)
75. Although it is believed that the modem tendency is thus to support examina-
tions of this nature, it is unfortunate that in Rhode Island law and equity, while
administered from the same tribunal, have distinct procedure. R. I. Gen. Laws
(923) ch. 323, sec. 4626, 4627, ch. 337, ch. 339.
SALES-CONVERSION-RESALE BY VENDOR AFTER SUIT FOR PURCHASE PRICE.-
The defendant vendor in a previous action recovered judgment against the plaintiff
for the purchase price of goods under N. Y. Laws, 1911, ch. 571, sec. I44 (1) :-
(Uniform Sales Act, sec. 63 (1)). Pending that action, the defendant, relying on
his vendor's lien, resold the goods. The buyer then sued for conversion and his
complaint was dismissed. Held, that the judgment be reversed. D'Aprile v. The
Turner-Looker Co. (1924, 4th Dept.) 2o9 App. Div. 223.
Where a vendee has broken a contract for the sale of personal property, the
Uniform Sales Act give, the vendor three remedies. He may acquire a right to
payment of the full purchase price while still retaining possession of the goods.
See. 63 (I)-; Kawin & Co. v. American Colortype Co. (i9r7, C. C. A. 7th) 243
Fed. 317; see American Aniline Products, Inc., v. D. N-gase & Co. Ltd. (i919,
ist Dept.) 187 App. Div. 555, i76 N. Y. Supp. 114. He may realize on them as
goods of the buyer, in part satisfaction of his right to the price. Sec. 6o (I) ;
Cohen v. Curtin (1ig, Sup. Ct App. T.) io7 Misc. 622, 177 N. Y. Supp.
246. Or he may rescind the sale and sue for damages 'caused by the breach.
Sec. 6i (1); Rylance v. James Walker Co. (I916) 129 Md. 475, 99 At. 597. The
theory of these sections is not clear, for under sec. 6o, the seller is expressly
allowed to retain any profit on the resale, a fact difficult to reconcile with the
intention otherwise, to treat the goods as the buyer's. See 2 Williston; Sales
(2d ed. 1924) sec. 553. The court in the instant case regarded the provision that
profits on a resale remain with the seller as making a resale under sec. 6o impossible,
once judgifient for the price had been recovered and "title" vested in the buyer.
This can hardly be the intention of the Act, for sec. 6o, just as sec. 63, proceeds
wholly on the assumption that the goods-subject only to lien-are the buyer's
and that the price is due. Pabst Brewing Co. v. E. Clemens Horst Co. (i9i6,
C. C. A. 9th) 229 Fed. 913. Thus a resale while suit for the price is pending,
may, under proper pleadings, be set up and result in corresponding reduction of
the judgment Urbansky v. Kutinsky (1912) 86 Conn. 22, 84 Atl. 317; Phillips
v. Stark (i92i) I86 Calif. 369, ig Pac. 509; see Schepp Co. v. Far Eastern Mfg.
Co. (1918, Sup. Ct App. T.) i68 N. Y. Supp. 636. That the buyer refused to
do this in his prior action is a poor reason for allowing him to maintain the
present action, unless the resale was not effected with reasonable judgment within
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sec. 60 (5). Cf. Guthrie Co. v. Thompson (1923) 89 Okla. 173, 214 Pac. 716. It
seems preferable to treat a resale under sec. 6o wholly as a realization on security.
Gaines Bros. v. Citiz.ens' Bank (192i) 84 Okla. 265, 204 Pac. 112 (resale "to fix
damages"); Woolworth Co. v. Cozington Bros. & Co. (1921) 191 Ky. 67, 229
S. W. 48 (resale "for account of buyer"). To permit the pleadings in a preceding
action for the price to turn a reasonable resale into a conversion, is to risk
removing the gdods from commerce during the entire pendency of the litigation.
Cf. Schueneman, v. Wollaeger (i92o) 170 Wis. 616, 176 N. W. 59. The clause
which reserves possible profits to the seller, while inconsistent, is unlikely to work
serious injustice, as buyers rarely refuse performance on a rising market.
TAXATION-GRANTEE OF CRANAGE AND WHARFAGE RIGHTS NOT TAXABLE AS
"OWNER OR OCCUPANT."--The legislature passed an act permitting a municipality
to assess "the owners or occupants of houses and lots intended to be benefited" by
the paving of streets; an amending statute provided for the assessment of "property
benefited." N. Y. Laws, i882, ch. 410, sec. 878. The plaintiff, an assignee of
exclusive cranage and wharfage rights granted by the" city, claimed an assessment
against its property was without authority since it was not the "owner or occupant"
of a house or lot but of "incorporeal rights" only. The trial court found the
assessment to be v.alid. Held, (one' judge dissenting) that the judgment be
reversed. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. City of New York (1924, Ist Dept.) 209 App.
Div. 434.
The interest of the plaintiff would ordinarily be denominated an assignable ease-
ment in gross. Mayor of New York v. Law (i89') 125 N.. Y. 380, 26 N. E. 471;
contra: Cadwalader v. Bailey (1891) 17 R.J.. 495, 23 Atl. 2o; see CommENTs
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 813. Under some statutes auth6rizing the assess-
ment of taxes on real estate, similar interests have been held taxable. Newark v.
State Board of Taxation (19ol) 66 N. J. L. 466, 49 Atl. 525 (right of way over
a highway); A-moskeag Co. v. Concord (1891) 66 N. H. 562 (privilege of over-
flowing lands for water power), But where taxing statutes are more strictly
construed a like interest has been held not taxable. Hancock County v. Imperial
Naval Stores Co. (i9o8) 93 Miss. 822, 47 So. 177 (privilege of taking turpentine
from trees). In New York a street railway having a right of way over a street
is not considered the "owner or occupant of a house or lot" for purposes of taxa-
tion. People, ex rel. Davidson v. Gilon (1891) 126 N. Y. 147, 27 N. E. 282.
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the plaintiff, although, under a disability to convey
the fee, had the privilege of occupying the premises, building a wharf there and
excluding others if they did not tender reasonable charges. The plaintiff also
had the power of making valid contracts for compensation for the use; and the
right that another should not interfere with the plaintiff's use and not utilize the
wharf without its consent. These relations would seem to constitute "ownership
or occupancy" although not complete ownership. The portion of the "property"
belonging to this plaintiff seems the greater and more valuable portion and ought
to be taxable and assessable under ordinary taxing statutes. Under a similar
New York statute taxing "land" and "real estate" such an interest has been held
taxable. Smith v. Mayor of New York (1877) 68 N. Y. 552. The decision in
the instant casi can be supported only by giving the terms "owner" or "occupant"
a narrow definition because of their previous history.
TAXATlON-INHERrTANCE TAx-PowER OF APPOINTMENT.--A testator, whose
will was probated before the enactment of an inheritance tax law, left property
in trust for the benefit of his children, with power of appointment in each. In
the event that the power was not exercised, the property was to go to their issue
in equal shares. The power was exercised, the appellants thereby receiving, more
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than such equal shares. It was contended by the appellants that if the power had
not been (xercised, there being three children, one-third would have been exempt
from taxation as coming directly from the estate of the grandfather, and there-
fore that such amount should be untaxed. Held, that where additional benefits
are received under a will as appointees under a prior will, the property passes
underthe first-mentioned will and is subject to the tax. Matter of Taylor (1924,
ist Dept.) 209 App. Div. 299.
In absence of statute expressly taxing property passing by power of appoint-
ment most courts applied the theory that the inheritance tax was on the transfer
from the donor of the power, and could not affect property passing under a will
with a power of appointment probated before but exercised after the enactment
of the tax law. Emnons'i,. Shaw (1898) 171 Mass. 41G, 5o N. E. 1033; Matter
of Harbeck (i9oo) I6I N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 85o. Other courts have held that the
tax was on the privilege of receiving, and that the appointee was bound to pay
the tax on the value of the property when so received. Fisher v. State (19o7)
io6 Md. io4, 66 At. 661. By statute, however, most states have provided that
the tax be imposed upon the exercise of. the power as though the property: belonged
-absolutely to the donee of the power. N. Y. Laws, 1922, ch. 43o, sec. 22o; Mas5.
Gen. Laws, Ig2I, ch. 65, sec. 2; Conn. Gen. Sts. igi8, ch. 66, sec. I7I; Gleason
and Otis, Inheritance Taxation (3d ed. 1922) 171-i77. The states are somewhat
divided as to the imposition of a tax either where there has been an omission to
exercise the power, or where the same person is appointed who would have received
the property in default of its exercise. The New, York statute provided that a
tax be imposed in either case. N. Y. Laws, 1897, ch. 284. But the exercise of
the power in such a case was held to be a nullity as it made no change in the
devolution of the property and so not taxable. Matter of Lansing (i9o5) 182
N. -Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882. This provision has.consequently been omitted from the
New York statute. N. Y. Laws, 1922, supra. It has been copied and retained,
however, by.some jurisdictions. Mass.' Gen. Laws, supra; Conn. Gen. Sts. supra.
But omitted by others. Ark. Acts, 1923, Act 438, sec. i; Ind. Acts, i92I, ch.
275, sec. 7. The principal case may be distinguished from Matter of Lansing,
supra, in that the appellants have received greater benefits due to the donee's
exercise of the power of appointment. But it would seem fairer to limit the rule
in the instant case to cases where there has been a substantial increase in the
benefits, otherwise the tax might be greater than the excess benefit received.
